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WATER, WATER, EVERYWHERE, AND 
PLENTY OF DROPS TO REGULATE: WHY 
THE NEWLY PUBLISHED WOTUS  
RULE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE  
COMMERCE CLAUSE  
SAMUEL WORTH* 
Abstract: On June 29, 2015, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers jointly published a final rule, “Definition 
of ‘Waters of the United States’ Under the Clean Water Act,” to clearly deline-
ate how the Clean Water Act protects streams and wetlands. The new Waters 
of the United States rule (“WOTUS Rule” or the “Rule”) abrogated the previ-
ous definition of waters of the United States under Clean Water Act jurisdic-
tion. To the great displeasure of many private landowners, the Rule entered in-
to effect on August 28, 2015. In particular, several critics have argued that the 
new WOTUS Rule’s regulation of “other waters,” its definition of “adjacent,” 
and its expanded construction of the term “tributary” violate the Commerce 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Examining select, representative challenges 
by the National Association of Homebuilders, the Kansas Livestock Associa-
tion, and the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association, this Note argues that 
those three features of the new WOTUS Rule do not, as alleged, contravene 
the Commerce Clause. As a matter of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the 
new WOTUS Rule is a legal tool to aid the federal government in its fight 
against the degradation and pollution of our nation’s waters. 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 29, 2015, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”) jointly published a 
final rule, “Definition of ‘Waters of the United States’ Under the Clean Wa-
ter Act” (“WOTUS Rule” or the “Rule”), that according to those agencies 
will clarify how streams and wetlands are protected under the Clean Water 
Act (CWA or the “Act”).1 The Rule entered into effect on August 28, 2015.2 
                                                                                                                           
 * Executive Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 
2015–2016. 
 1 See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 
(June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.); The Final 
Clean Water Rule, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/cleanwaterrule/final-clean-water-
rule [https://perma.cc/9SX6-MBEQ]. 
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The Rule has elicited many challenges and significant criticism, pre-
dominantly from private landowners and agents of industry.3 Arguably the 
most common nexus of these attacks is that the Rule unconstitutionally al-
lows the federal government to regulate waters that, as a matter of Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence, should be considered purely intrastate.4 Specif-
ically, several critics have alleged that the new WOTUS Rule’s regulation 
of “other waters,” its definition of “adjacent,” and its expanded construction 
of the term “tributary” directly violate the Commerce Clause.5 
This Note argues that the above three changes to the definition of “Wa-
ters of the United States” do not cause the new Rule to violate the Com-
merce Clause as argued in comments submitted by several industrial and 
agricultural parties in opposition to the WOTUS Rule.6 This Note examines 
Commerce Clause challenges articulated in three representative opposition 
comments submitted by the National Association of Homebuilders 
(“NAHB”), the Kansas Livestock Association (“KLA”), and the National 
Cattlemen’s Beef Association (“NCBA”).7 
Isolating the NAHB’s opposition to the new Rule’s regulation of “oth-
er waters,” the KLA’s criticism of the proposed scope of the term “adja-
cent,” and the NCBA’s condemnation of the proposed definition of “tribu-
taries,” the Note argues against the groups’ claims that the WOTUS Rule 
violates the Commerce Clause.8 Part I of this Note addresses the statutory 
and regulatory history of clean water, and the subsequent evolution of the 
WOTUS Rule.9 Part II addresses the specific parts of the new Rule that 
                                                                                                                           
 2 The Final Clean Water Rule, supra note 1. 
 3 See Kansas Livestock Association, Comment Letter on Proposed Definition of “Waters of the 
United States,” at 4 (Nov. 13, 2014) [hereinafter KLA Comment], http://www.kla.org/CMDocs/
KansasLA/Library/KLA_WOTUS.pdf [perma.cc/7T4N-2FNV]; National Association of Home 
Builders, Comment Letter on Proposed Definition of “Waters of the United States,” at 22 (Nov. 
14, 2014) [hereinafter NAHB Comment], http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?document
Id=EPA-HQ-OW-2011-0880-19540&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=
pdf [perma.cc/4CEN-6JUJ]; National Cattleman’s Beef Association & Public Lands Council, 
Comment Letter on Proposed Definition of “Waters of the United States,” at 5 (Oct. 28, 2014) 
[hereinafter NCBA Comment], http://portal.criticalimpact.com/go.cfm?a=1&eid=d14cf387088f64
853947229f28c3afba&c=25397&jid=bef689c00f8ee2a5&d=4b334dad04bb2deb [perma.cc/2XW6-
SUZW]. 
 4 See KLA Comment, supra note 3, at 4; NAHB Comment, supra note 3, at 22; NCBA 
Comment, supra note 3, at 5. 
 5 See KLA Comment, supra note 3, at 12; NAHB Comment, supra note 3, at 36; NCBA 
Comment, supra note 3, at 5 & n.11. 
 6 See infra notes 142–201 and accompanying text. 
 7 See infra notes 174–201 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 174–255 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 12–141 and accompanying text. 
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have instigated Commerce Clause arguments.10 Part III evaluates the legali-
ty of the WOTUS Rule with respect to the Commerce Clause.11 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Development of the Clean Water Act 
In 1899, President William McKinley signed into law the Rivers and 
Harbors Act, the first federal water pollution law.12 The Act was meant to en-
sure unobstructed passage along U.S. water bodies, and specifically addressed 
dumping and discharge into navigable territorial waters.13 Section 10 of the 
Act outlawed any obstructions that impeded navigation of any waters without 
congressional approval.14 Section 13 prohibits the discharge of substances 
from shore or floating craft into navigable waters or tributaries.15 Through 
Section 12, the Rivers and Harbors Act became a way to penalize those pol-
luting the nation’s waterways.16 In 1960, the United States Supreme Court 
applied Section 13 in United States v. Republic Steel Corp., holding that a 
steel company could not discharge wastewater into the Calumet River.17 The 
Court in Republic Steel held that the discharge of wastewater and industrial 
solids had reduced the depth of the river’s channel, which impaired its navi-
gable capacity.18 
By 1948, an increase in industrialization heightened the concern that 
communicable diseases could be spread by the discharge of sewage into or 
near drinking water intakes.19 Protecting drinking water from contamination 
became a national priority, culminating in the passage of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act (“FWPCA”).20 The FWPCA delegated the task of 
controlling water pollution to the individual states, but allowed for formal 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See infra notes 142–201 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 202–255 and accompanying text. 
 12 Robyn Kenney, Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, United States, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EARTH 
(Sept. 3, 2006, 9:05 PM), http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/155764/ [perma.cc/7679-8QJB]; see 
River and Harbor Act of 1899, Pub. L. No. 55-425, 30 Stat. 1151 (codified in scattered sections of 
33 U.S.C.). 
 13 JOEL M. GROSS & KERRI L. STELCEN, CLEAN WATER ACT 5 (2012). 
 14 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2012); Digest of Federal Resource Laws of Interest to the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service: Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
https://www.fws.gov/laws/lawsdigest/RIV1899.HTML [https://perma.cc/4T7E-ESDJ]. 
 15 33 U.S.C. § 407; Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF 
ENG’RS, http://www.sam.usace.army.mil/Missions/Regulatory/RegulatoryFAQ/RiversandHarbors
AppropriationActof1899.aspx [https://perma.cc/LT3J-S5G4]. 
 16 33 U.S.C. § 406; see United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 485 (1960). 
 17 See 362 U.S. at 485. 
 18 See id. at 489, 492–93. 
 19 See GROSS & STELCEN, supra note 13, at 6. 
 20 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 845, 62 Stat. 1155 (codified 
at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1376); GROSS & STELCEN, supra note 13, at 6. 
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hearings before the FWPCA administrator if the state could not resolve the 
problem on its own.21 However, by 1971 “only 50 informal conferences had 
been held[,] . . . only four matters [had] proceeded . . . to the administrative 
hearing stage,” and only one case had gone to court.22 Regardless of Con-
gress’s intent in passing the FWPCA, the legislation was lacking in en-
forcement.23 
In late 1972, Congress enacted a heavily revised version of the FWP-
CA, aptly named the Clean Water Act.24 By enacting the CWA, Congress 
sought to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integ-
rity of the nation’s waters.”25 The CWA represented a series of amendments 
that substantively overhauled the FWPCA and established a new national 
focus on clean water by instituting uniform technology-based standards.26 
The CWA sought to attain a national water quality that could protect fish 
and wildlife habitat, as well as humans’ ability to use water recreationally.27 
It also sought to increase federal funding of publicly-owned treatment 
works, and to develop and implement waste treatment management plan-
ning in the individual states.28 
Further, the Act endeavored to fund discharge-eliminating technology, 
and programs for so-called non-point source pollution control.29 To achieve 
these goals, the Act expressly prohibited discharges of any pollutant into the 
waters of the United States without specific authorization via National Pol-
lutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permitting, and estab-
lished “pretreatment standards” for “indirect dischargers.”30 Additionally, 
the Act became federally enforceable by EPA.31 The Act set uniform, tech-
                                                                                                                           
 21 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1376; GROSS & STELCEN, supra note 13, at 6. 
 22 See GROSS & STELCEN, supra note 13, at 6. 
 23 See id. 
 24 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1274; GROSS & STELCEN, supra note 13, at 7. 
 25 GROSS & STELCEN, supra note 13, at 7; see 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). 
 26 GROSS & STELCEN, supra note 13, at 7–8. 
 26 See id. at 8. 
 27 See id. 
 28 See id. 
 29 See id.; What Is Nonpoint Source Pollution?, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/
polwaste/nps/whatis.cfm [https://perma.cc/2BMQ-R9F4] (“[N]onpoint source pollution generally 
results from land runoff, precipitation, atmospheric deposition, drainage, seepage or hydrologic 
modification . . . . Nonpoint source (NPS) pollution, unlike pollution from industrial and sewage 
treatment plants, comes from many diffuse sources.”). 
 30 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INTRODUCTION TO THE NATIONAL PRETREATMENT PRO-
GRAM, at iii (2011), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-10/documents/pretreatment_
program_intro_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/YEH8-RQ5L] (stating that indirect dischargers are non-
point source dischargers of pollutants to waters of the United States); National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES), ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/npdes/ [https://
perma.cc/LW93-NV7W]; see 33 U.S.C. § 402 (2012). 
 31 GROSS & STELCEN, supra note 13, at 8. 
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nology-based effluent limitations to be determined by EPA administrators, 
and included a comprehensive water quality program.32 Furthermore, the 
Act authorized states, the federal government, and individual citizens to 
enforce its provisions.33 EPA and the Corps were made jointly responsible 
for monitoring compliance through on-site investigations and enforcement 
of penalties for unpermitted discharges.34 
The CWA was amended in 1977 to require that Best Available Tech-
nology (“BAT”) limitations for toxic pollutants and Best Available Conven-
tional Pollutant Control Technology (“BCT”) limitations for conventional 
pollutants be achieved by July 1, 1984.35 BAT limitation standards were 
also extended to cover toxic pollutants with an establishment deadline of 
July 1, 1984, and nonconventional pollutants with a deadline of July 1, 
1987.36 The 1977 amendments further stressed that while EPA should have 
“ultimate enforcement authority,” the individual states should bear the ini-
tial responsibility for managing and enforcing the CWA.37 The CWA was 
amended once again in 1987 to include, among other additions, the Water 
Quality Act of 1987, to bolster regulation of point source storm-water dis-
charges.38 
Since the passage of the CWA, the quality of U.S. water has measura-
bly improved.39 Additionally, an EPA study of U.S. lakes revealed that more 
than half of the lakes surveyed achieved reductions in nutrient concentra-
tions, and more than twenty-five percent showed improved trophic status.40 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See id. at 9. 
 33 See id. 
 34 Clean Water Act (CWA) Compliance Monitoring, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.
gov/compliance/clean-water-act-cwa-compliance-monitoring [https://perma.cc/Z364-DGJZ]. 
 35 JEROME G. ROSE, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING 323 (1983) (stat-
ing that the CWA lists 65 toxic pollutants and “authorizes EPA to add or delete [pollutants] from 
that list,” and defining nonconventional pollutants as pollutants other than conventional and toxic 
pollutants). 
 36 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NPDES PERMIT WRITERS’ MANUAL 1-1 to -8 (2010), http://
www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-09/documents/pwm_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/TUV5-
3TPD] (defining “toxic pollutants” as those 65 listed by EPA, “conventional pollutants” as those 
generally found in “sanitary waste from households, businesses, and industries,” and “nonconven-
tional pollutants” as those that fit into neither category). 
 37 GROSS & STELCEN, supra note 13, at 10. 
 38 See id. 
 39 See Protecting the Clean Water Act, AM. RIVERS, http://www.americanrivers.org/initiatives/
pollution/clean-water-act/ [https://perma.cc/BT6P-2HF6]. 
 40 See Mary Mazzoni, Earth Day 2012: Successes Since the Beginning of the Movement, 
HUFFPOST GREEN (Apr. 22, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/22/earth-day-2012-
successes_n_1434352.html [https://perma.cc/HD3C-Y3NR] (defining “trophic status” as “a useful 
means of classifying lakes and describing lake processes in terms of the productivity of the sys-
tem,” and explaining that a waterbody with a strong trophic status is “well-nourished” with high 
nutrient levels and high plant growth); Mark D. Munn & Pixie D. Hamilton, New Studies Initiated 
by the U.S. Geological Survey—Effects of Nutrient Enrichment on Stream Ecosystems, U.S. GEO. 
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The CWA has significantly improved the health of rivers, lakes, and coastal 
waters, preventing billions of pounds of pollution from contaminating U.S. 
waters, and doubling the number of waterways available for fishing and 
swimming.41 While the Act has driven substantial progress for our clean wa-
ter, continued implementation and enforcement is necessary for future suc-
cess.42 EPA has asserted that the new WOTUS Rule will help effectuate the 
goals of the Clean Water Act by reducing confusion about CWA protection.43 
B. The Scope of the Commerce Clause Power 
Congress derives its legal authority to regulate the nation’s water large-
ly from four areas of the Constitution: the Treaty Clause, the Property 
Clause, the Spending Clause, and the Commerce Clause.44 As it pertains to 
the Clean Water Act, the Treaty Power—found in Article II, Section 2 of the 
Constitution—is rooted in the Senate’s power of advice and consent to the 
President in making international treaties.45 The Property Clause of Article 
IV, Section 3 allows Congress to make rules and regulations with respect to 
property belonging to the federal government.46 The power of Congress to 
tax and spend found in Article I, Section 8 allows it to levy taxes and spend 
money to benefit the general welfare, and the Commerce Clause, found in 
Article I, Section 8, authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce 
among the several states.47 
The Commerce Clause was the principal legal basis for Congress’s pow-
er to enact the CWA, and is frequently invoked as legal justification for the 
                                                                                                                           
SURVEY (Dec. 2003), http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs11803/ [https://perma.cc/NK6R-YNVE] (“Elevat-
ed concentrations of nutrients can lead to excessive, often unsightly growth of aquatic plants . . . 
[which] reduces dissolved oxygen in water and alters stream habitat, both of which are critical for 
fish and other aquatic life.”); James Salzman, Why Rivers No Longer Burn, SLATE (Dec. 10, 2012, 
5:20 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2012/12/clean_water_act_
40th_anniversary_the_greatest_success_in_environmental_law.html [https://perma.cc/L24E-YQ3H]; 
Understanding Lakes, LAKE ACCESS, http://www.lakeaccess.org/ecology/lakeecologyprim15.html 
[https://perma.cc/V69A-XDLN] (defining “trophic status” as “a useful means of classifying lakes 
and describing lake processes in terms of the productivity of the system”). 
 41 See Protecting the Clean Water Act, supra note 39. 
 42 See id. (“[M]any of our rivers remain polluted by urban and agricultural runoff and sewer 
overflows . . . .”). 
 43 What the Clean Water Rule Does, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/cleanwater
rule/what-clean-water-rule-does [https://perma.cc/YR68-XW4B]. 
 44 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; John Laumer, 
U.S. Congress’s Constitutional Authority for Clean Water Protection, TREEHUGGER (July 26, 2007), 
http://www.treehugger.com/corporate-responsibility/us-congressatms-constitutional-authority-for-
clean-water-protection.html [https://perma.cc/6JG7-ZELQ]. 
 45 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; Laumer, supra note 44. 
 46 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
 47 Id. art. I, § 8. 
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Act.48 Notably, “neither the Supreme Court nor federal appellate courts” have 
ever declared an environmental statute unconstitutional for “exceeding Con-
gress’s power under the Commerce Clause.”49 Rather, courts have affirmed 
that the Commerce Clause grants Congress regulatory authority over three 
types of commercial activity.50 First, Congress has the authority to regulate 
“channels” of interstate commerce.51 Second, it can also regulate “instrumen-
talities” of interstate commerce.52 Finally, Congress is also permitted to regu-
late “activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”53 The Com-
merce Clause has allowed Congress to legislate seemingly non-economic 
issues of a social, moral, or public health character so long as the legislation 
is shown to remedy some burden on interstate commerce.54 
C. Legal Background: Commerce Clause 
Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the authority to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations, among the several states, and with the Indi-
an tribes.55 In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court considered wheth-
er the Gun-Free School Zones Act—designating as a federal offense firearm 
possession in any area the possessor has reasonable cause to believe is a 
school zone—exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.56 
Specifically, the Court answered the question of whether gun posses-
sion in school zones is an activity that substantially affects interstate com-
merce.57 The Court held that gun possession in school zones is too indirect-
                                                                                                                           
 48 Cameron Smith, Far-Reaching “Waters of the United States” Rule Could Be the Most Signifi-
cant EPA Regulation You Have Never Heard About: Opinion, ALABAMA.COM (Oct. 18, 2014, 9:09 
AM), http://www.al.com/opinion/index.ssf/2014/10/far-reaching_waters_of_the_uni.html [https://
perma.cc/N6NV-NKXU]. 
 49 JAY AUSTIN & BRUCE MYERS, ENVTL. L. INST., ANCHORING THE CLEAN WATER ACT: CON-
GRESS’S CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO PROTECT THE NATION’S WATERS 2 (2007), http://www.eli.
org/sites/default/files/eli-pubs/d17_07.pdf [perma.cc/568E-G8X5]. 
 50 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (holding that Congress can regulate 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause); Heart of Atlanta Motel, 
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964) (holding that Congress can regulate channels of 
interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause); United States v. Royal Rock Co-op, 307 U.S. 
533, 544 (1939) (holding that the Commerce Clause authorizes the regulation of activities that 
interfere with interstate commerce). 
 51 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 256; United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 706 
(4th Cir. 2003). 
 52 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. 
 53 Id. at 559. 
 54 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 256–57 (holding that Congress could use its 
Commerce Clause authority to force private enterprises to comply with the Civil Rights Act of 
1964). 
 55 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 56 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551–52. 
 57 Id. 
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ly related to interstate commerce for Congress to legislate the activity using 
its Commerce Clause authority, and in so doing, clarified the scope of that 
authority by holding that Congress is limited to regulating the channels of 
interstate commerce, the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and ac-
tivities that “substantially affect interstate commerce,” that are themselves 
“economic in nature.”58 
Since Lopez, courts have further clarified standards of Commerce 
Clause review.59 For example, courts have held that it is appropriate to con-
duct Commerce Clause analysis on a case-by-case basis, using scientific 
evidence.60 In United States v. Alderman, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit considered whether Congress’s Commerce Clause authority 
would allow them to criminalize the possession of body armor by convicted 
felons.61 The Ninth Circuit held that the law in question did not exceed 
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, and further held that questions of 
Commerce Clause application should be answered using case-specific anal-
ysis, avoiding “bald assertions.”62 
Clarifying the practice of fact-specific analysis, in National Associa-
tion of Home Builders v. Babbitt (“NAHB”), the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit held that Commerce Clause analysis should 
consider available scientific evidence.63 In NAHB, the D.C. Circuit consid-
ered whether Congress’s Commerce Clause authority allowed the Endan-
gered Species Act to prohibit the taking of an endangered species of fly.64 
The court concluded that prohibiting the taking of the endangered fly was 
an appropriate exercise of Commerce Clause power vis-à-vis the Endan-
gered Species Act.65 In its decision, the court further stated that it relied on 
scientific evidence to establish the fly’s importance to commercial actors.66 
Courts have also expanded the scope of the Lopez regulatory catego-
ries, in relevant part, channels of interstate commerce.67 In United States v. 
                                                                                                                           
 58 Id. at 551–52, 558–59; see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000) (holding 
that Congress’s power to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce is limited 
to activities that are economic in nature). 
 59 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59; United States v. Alderman, 565 F.3d 641, 658 (9th Cir. 
2009); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 60 See Alderman, 565 F.3d at 658; Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1054 (stating 
that a question of Commerce Clause jurisprudence should be resolved with any available fact-
specific scientific evidence relevant to the determination of whether or not an action would have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce). 
 61 See Alderman, 565 F.3d at 644–45. 
 62 See id. at 658. 
 63 See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1043. 
 64 See id. at 1054. 
 65 Id. 
 66 See id. 
 67 United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 706 (4th Cir. 2003); see United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995). 
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Deaton, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered wheth-
er Congress’s Commerce Clause powers allowed it to regulate the flow of 
polluted water from privately owned wetlands to an adjacent roadside ditch 
and into a navigable river.68 The Fourth Circuit held that the regulatory ac-
tion was indeed within Congress’s power, and further extrapolated that 
Congress’s authority to regulate channels of interstate commerce extended 
to the channel’s use or misuse.69 
Additionally, in United States v. Royal Rock Co-op, the Supreme Court 
considered whether the federal government could use the Commerce Clause 
to compel a New York milk producing cooperative association to comply 
with an order by the Secretary of Agriculture regarding the marketing and 
pricing of milk.70 The Court held that by not complying with the order, the 
cooperative was affecting the farmers’ purchasing power, destroying the 
value of agricultural assets, and interfering with channels of interstate 
commerce.71 According to the Court, in addition to regulating channels of 
interstate commerce themselves, the Commerce Clause also authorizes 
Congress to regulate activities that interfere with those channels.72 
D. The Scope of “Waters of the United States” 
While the CWA regulates “navigable waters of the United States,” the 
statute defines “navigable waters” as “the waters of the United States includ-
ing territorial seas,” a definition that applies to all provisions of the Act.73 
The lack of clarity of the statutory definition of “navigable waters” has pro-
voked considerable litigation, including three significant Supreme Court 
decisions.74 Consideration of the CWA’s legislative history supports the 
contention that “waters of the United States” was meant to cover more than 
waters of navigable size and character.75 
                                                                                                                           
 68 See Deaton, 332 F.3d at 701–02. 
 69 See id. at 706–07. 
 70 United States v. Royal Rock Co-op, 307 U.S. 533, 539–41(1939). 
 71 See id. at 541–45 
 72 See id. at 544. 
 73 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2012); Donna M. Downing, Scope of “The Waters of the United 
States” Protected by the Clean Water Act, in THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK 11, 12 (Mark 
A. Ryan ed., 2011). 
 74 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 763 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook 
Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001) (noting that Congress intended the 
CWA to “regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed ‘navigable’ under the classical 
understanding of that term”); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 123 
(1985); Downing, supra note 73, at 11–18 (discussing important cases that outlay the historical 
statutory jurisdiction of the CWA). 
 75 See Downing, supra note 73, at 12. 
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The 1972 amendments that created the CWA were a direct response to 
serious degradation of America’s waters.76 Moreover, the stated purpose of 
the CWA was to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biologi-
cal integrity of the Nation’s waters.”77 Congress was in fact hesitant to de-
fine the term “navigable waters,” for fear that the term would be interpreted 
narrowly, and the CWA would be rendered ineffectual as the prior Rivers 
and Harbors Act had been.78 The House Report stated: 
One term that the Committee was reluctant to define was the term 
“navigable waters.” The reluctance was based on the fear that any 
interpretation would be read narrowly. However, this is not the 
Committee’s intent. The Committee fully intends that the term 
“navigable waters” be given the broadest possible constitutional in-
terpretation, unencumbered by agency determinations which have 
been made or may be made for administrative purposes.79 
The Senate Public Works Committee expressed a similar sentiment, stating 
that the CWA requires a broad geographic scope due to water’s natural eco-
logical connectedness, finding that “water moves in hydrologic circles, and 
it is essential that discharge of pollutants be controlled at the source.”80 EPA 
and the Corps are the administrative agencies charged with enforcing the 
CWA.81 Following the 1972 amendments, both agencies worked to define 
“waters of the United States” more accurately by providing specific de-
tails.82 The old rule defined “waters of the United States” to mean: 
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, 
or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, 
including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the 
tide; (2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands; (3) All 
other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including in-
termittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie 
potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, 
degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or for-
eign commerce including any such waters: (i) Which are or could 
be used by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational or other 
                                                                                                                           
 76 See id. at 11. 
 77 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a); see Downing, supra note 73, at 11. 
 78 Downing, supra note 73, at 12; see GROSS & STELCEN, supra note 13, at 6 (explaining that 
a rapid increase in industrial waste necessitated more stringent clean water legislation). 
 79 See H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 131 (1972); Downing, supra note 73, at 12. 
 80 See S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 77 (1977); Downing, supra note 73, at 12. 
 81 Clean Water Act—An Overview, NAT’L AGRIC. L. CTR., http://nationalaglawcenter.org/
overview/cw/ [http://perma.cc/KG9N-HVFX]. 
 82 Downing, supra note 73, at 12. 
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purposes; or (ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be tak-
en and sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or (iii) Which are 
used or could be used for industrial purposes by industries in in-
terstate commerce; (4) All impoundments of waters otherwise de-
fined as waters of the United States under this definition; (5) 
Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (4) of 
this section; (6) The territorial seas; (7) Wetlands adjacent to wa-
ters (other than waters that are themselves wetlands) identified in 
paragraphs (a)(1) through (6) of this section.83 
This definition established by EPA and the Corps is clearly quite broad and 
drew concern regarding what was seen as expanded federal jurisdiction over 
potentially any body of water.84 To assuage some of these concerns, the 
agencies generally do not consider certain types of water-bodies to be “wa-
ters of the United States,” including drainage and irrigation ditches, artifi-
cially irrigated areas, man-made lakes and ponds, artificial reflecting and 
swimming pools, and water-filled depressions.85 The agencies stated that 
they would reserve the right on a case-by-case basis, however, to determine 
if such a water falls within their jurisdiction under the CWA.86 
E. Judicial Determinations of the Clean Water Act’s Jurisdictional Limits 
It is well settled that navigable-in-fact waters are under the jurisdiction 
of the CWA.87 The Supreme Court has spent considerable time contemplat-
ing whether non-navigable waters fall under the CWA jurisdiction, as 
well.88 While the Court has held that federal agencies may interpret the 
CWA broadly, often non-navigable waters must have a substantial connec-
tion to a navigable water, a requirement that can be satisfied by a hydrologic 
connection between a non-navigable water and a navigable one.89 
In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., the Supreme Court 
considered a challenge to the scope of the definition of “waters of the Unit-
ed States.”90 In Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., the Corps sued to enjoin a 
                                                                                                                           
 83 See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2015). 
 84 See Downing, supra note 73, at 13 (citing concerns about the jurisdictional status of tempo-
rary pooling areas such as construction excavation sites). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Theodore L. Garrett, Overview of the Clean Water Act, in THE CLEAN WATER ACT HAND-
BOOK, supra note 73, at 7. 
 88 See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 763 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N. 
Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 162 (2001); United States v. Riverside 
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139 & n.9 (1985). 
 89 See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742; Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. at 139 n.9. 
 90 Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. at 123. 
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property owner from filling wetlands without the Corps’s authorization.91 In 
a unanimous opinion, the Court held that wetlands adjacent to navigable 
waters are so interconnected with those waters that they must be included in 
the regulatory definition of “waters of the United States.”92 The Court noted 
that when faced with a challenge to define the scope of Congress’s regulato-
ry authority, it should look to the relevant legislative history for guidance.93 
The Court stated that the overall objective of the CWA is to restore the 
integrity and viability of the nation’s waters, and that in keeping with that 
objective, Congress needed broad-reaching jurisdiction to accomplish its 
clean-water goals.94 Specifically, the Court held that policy makers cannot 
draw “artificial lines” to regulate water-polluting activities because “water 
moves in hydrologic cycles,” which causes waters traditionally thought of 
as non-jurisdictional to affect conventionally jurisdictional water quality.95 
Although the Act defines its authority as extending over “navigable 
waters,” the definition of “waters of the United States” clearly demonstrates 
that a water need not necessarily be navigable-in-fact to be regulated.96 The 
Court held that the Corps has authority to interpret the CWA broadly, and 
the agency’s decision that adjacent wetlands are inseparably bound to “wa-
ters of the United States” was not unreasonable.97 
Additionally, in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers, the Supreme Court addressed the question of iso-
lated ponds that had been created at the bottom of a proposed solid waste 
bale-fill site in Cook County, Illinois.98 The Corps argued that while the 
ponds in question were isolated, they could be regulated by the CWA under 
the Commerce Clause because they provided a habitat for migratory birds 
that crossed state lines.99 The Corps argued that because the birds cross 
state lines, they affect interstate commerce and thus the ponds they use as 
habitats can be regulated under the Commerce Clause.100 
                                                                                                                           
 91 See id. 
 92 Id. at 139. 
 93 Id. at 132. 
 94 Id. at 133. 
 95 Id. at 133–34. 
 96 See id. at 123–24. 
 97 See id. at 139. 
 98 531 U.S. 159, 162 (2001). 
 99 See id. 
 100 See id. at 164–65; see also TIMOTHY BISHOP ET AL., MAYER, BROWN & PLATT, ONE FOR THE 
BIRDS: THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS’ “MIGRATORY BIRD RULE” 1–2 (n.d.), http://www.mayerbrown.
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menting on the Corps’s Commerce Clause argument in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook 
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had held that the 
Corps properly exercised its authority under the Commerce Clause by deny-
ing a permit to fill in seasonal ponds at the base of an abandoned gravel pit 
that was to be converted into a solid waste disposal site.101 In an apparent 
rejection of the so-called “migratory bird rule,” however, the Supreme 
Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, holding that the Corps had overstepped 
its authority.102 The Court reasoned that while the CWA implicitly allows a 
broad construction of the term “navigable waters,” “it is one thing to give 
the word [navigable] limited effect, and quite another to give it no effect 
whatever.”103 The Court held that because the isolated seasonal ponds did 
not have a significant nexus to “navigable waters,” their regulation was out-
side the scope of the CWA.104 
In Rapanos v. United States, the petitioner had filled in isolated wet-
lands on his private property to construct a shopping mall.105 The wetlands 
were connected to Saginaw Bay and Lake Huron through roughly eleven 
miles of man-made ditches and natural streams.106 In a split decision, the 
Supreme Court held that the wetlands did not qualify as waters of the Unit-
ed States.107 Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that “waters of the United States” 
extends beyond traditional navigable waters to include “only those relative-
ly permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water ‘forming 
geographic features’ that are described in ordinary parlance as ‘streams[,] 
. . . oceans, rivers [and] lakes.’”108 Justice Scalia further stated that the defi-
nition of “relatively permanent” does not necessarily exclude water bodies 
that might occasionally dry up.109 
With regard to the wetlands, specifically, the Court found that only 
wetlands with “a continuous surface connection to bodies . . . considered 
‘waters of the United States’ in their own right” are covered by the CWA.110 
Therefore, for a wetland to be covered, it must be “relatively permanent,” and 
must have a “continuous surface connection” to traditional waters of the 
United States, essentially “making it difficult to determine where the ‘wa-
ter’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.”111 
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Justice Anthony Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, wrote that the Ra-
panos case turned on the interpretation of the phrase “significant nexus.”112 
Justice Kennedy opined that for a non-navigable water to be jurisdictional 
under the Commerce Clause, a significant nexus must be present to connect 
it to a navigable water.113 The presence of a significant nexus, he wrote, 
must be determined on a case-by-case basis, and hinges on whether a non-
navigable water “significantly affect[s] the chemical, physical, and biologi-
cal integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as ‘naviga-
ble.’”114 This interpretation of how to judge jurisdictional boundaries in the 
Commerce Clause context of the CWA broke from the precedent laid out in 
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. and Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook 
County, neither of which emphasized a case-by-case “significant nexus” 
determination.115 
F. The Newly-Passed WOTUS Rule 
On April 21, 2014, EPA and the Corps proposed the new Rule, entitled 
“Definition of Waters of the U.S. Under the Clean Water Act,” which ad-
dressed the types of water-bodies that fall within the agencies’ jurisdiction 
under the CWA.116 The agencies published the Rule on June 29, 2015, and it 
officially took effect on August 28, 2015.117 In relevant part, the new Rule 
redefines “waters of the United States.”118 A possible reflection of Justice 
Kennedy’s call for a case-by-case analysis, and an evidence-based signifi-
cant nexus determination as detailed in his Rapanos concurrence, the new 
definition relies heavily on a comprehensive EPA report entitled “Connec-
tivity of Stream and Wetlands to Downstream Waters: A Review and Syn-
thesis of the Scientific Evidence.”119 The report synthesizes and focuses 
over 1000 scientific reports that demonstrate how tributaries, wetlands, and 
                                                                                                                           
 112 See id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 113 Id. at 782. 
 114 See id. at 780–82. 
 115 See id. at 753–54 (plurality opinion). 
 116 Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 
22,188 (proposed Apr. 21, 2014). 
 117 Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 
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other waters are interconnected, and related biologically, chemically, and 
physically.120 
The draft report concluded that streams, wetlands, and open waters in 
landscape settings that have bidirectional hydrologic exchanges with 
streams or rivers have a significant effect on downstream waters.121 Even 
open waters in landscape settings without bidirectional hydrologic mixing 
with downstream waters, such as prairie potholes, vernal pools, and playa 
lakes can appreciably effect downstream waters if connected through sur-
face or shallow-subsurface water.122 These connections occur on such a 
wide and unpredictable gradient that they must be analyzed on a case-by-
case basis.123 The new Rule defines “waters of the United States” as: 
[(a)][1] All waters which are currently used, were used in the 
past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign com-
merce, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow 
of the tide; [2] All interstate waters, including interstate wetlands; 
[3] The territorial seas; [4] All impoundments of waters otherwise 
identified as waters of the United States under this section; [5] All 
tributaries, as defined in paragraph (c)(3) of this section, of waters 
identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section; [6] All 
waters adjacent to a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through 
(5) of this section, including wetlands, ponds, lakes, oxbows, im-
poundments, and similar waters; [7] All waters in paragraphs 
(a)(7)(i) through (v) of this section where they are determined, on 
a case-specific basis, to have a significant nexus to a water identi-
fied in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section. The waters 
identified in each of paragraphs (a)(7)(i) through (v) of this sec-
tion are similarly situated and shall be combined, for purposes of 
a significant nexus analysis, in the watershed that drains to the 
nearest water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this 
section. Waters identified in this paragraph shall not be combined 
with waters identified in paragraph (a)(6) of this section when 
performing a significant nexus analysis. If waters identified in 
this paragraph are also an adjacent water under paragraph (a)(6), 
                                                                                                                           
 120 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 119, at ES-1 to -15; see NAT’L ASS’N OF CTYS., COUN-
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they are an adjacent water and no case-specific significant nexus 
analysis is required. 124 
The WOTUS Rule has been criticized—primarily by small business own-
ers, property owners, and farmers—for expanding the federal government’s 
regulatory reach to cover bodies of water not originally contemplated by the 
CWA, and not permitted under the Constitution.125 Critics argue that the 
new definition of “waters of the United States” will give EPA and the Corps 
jurisdiction over “puddles, ponds, ditches, ephemerals (land that collects 
water during a heavy rain but is dry most of the time),” and land adjacent to 
those waters.126 
Opponents of the Rule believe that it will give the federal agencies 
control over land-use decisions and farming or business practices near wa-
ter.127 It has also been alleged that the new Rule would expose citizens to 
civil lawsuits pushing for ditches or similarly temporal water-bodies to be 
similarly regulated.128 The WOTUS Rule has prompted arguments from 
business and agricultural organizations, such as the National Pork Producers 
Council, who contend that the Rule will expand CWA permitting jurisdic-
tion over “millions of miles of streams and adjacent lands” and activities 
such as “applying fertilizers and pesticides and (potentially) planting 
crops.”129 
Lawmakers have also voiced objections, characterizing the Rule as a 
“land-grab” by federal agencies against private property owners.130 More 
than two hundred and sixty lawmakers on both sides of the aisle in the 
House and Senate have objected to the Rule.131 Two hundred and thirty-one 
members of the House sent a letter to both EPA and the Corps requesting 
that the Rule be withdrawn.132 In June 2014 Republican lawmakers intro-
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duced a bill signed by thirty senators that would stop EPA and the Corps 
from proceeding with the Rule.133 Moreover, on June 18, 2014, the House 
Appropriations Committee passed a bill to stop the Corps from proceeding 
with the Rule.134 
Business owners have also voiced their concerns: the Small Business 
Association Office of Advocacy (“SBA”) requested that EPA and the Corps 
scuttle the new Rule, citing that the agencies failed to consider the impacts 
on small businesses.135 Specifically, the SBA cited the fact that the Rule will 
directly impact the permitting process, which could encumber business.136 
For instance, the SBA has said that because utility power lines frequently 
cross areas such as wetlands and floodplains, small utility companies would 
have to apply for numerous permits to “construct and maintain roads that 
provide access to the utility grid.”137 The SBA also cited the estimate that 
the new Rule would increase permitting costs by as much as $52 million 
annually, and mitigation costs by as much as $113.5 million.138 
While the WOTUS Rule has certainly amassed its share of detractors, 
EPA contends that most of the criticism is unfounded.139 EPA has stated that 
the Rule merely reduces confusion about clean water protection by clarify-
ing the types of waters covered under the CWA to help states better comply 
with the Act’s provisions.140 EPA further states that the Rule does not cover 
any new types of water, does not extend coverage of the CWA, does not 
regulate groundwater, and does not expand the jurisdiction of EPA and the 
Corps over ditches as claimed.141 
II. ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSED RULE PROVOKE  
COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGES 
Since 1972, the Clean Water Act’s (“CWA”) declaration of purpose has 
been to regulate and eventually eliminate the discharge of pollutants into 
navigable waters.142 Under the CWA, the term “navigable waters” means 
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“waters of the United States.”143 The term “waters of the United States” is 
quite broad, and has traditionally included waters used for interstate and 
foreign commerce, and also those waters with a significant nexus to naviga-
ble interstate waters with a traditional commercial use.144 
A. Differences Between the Current Rule and the Newly  
Passed WOTUS Rule 
According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”), the new waters of the United 
States rule (“WOTUS Rule” or the “Rule”) has revised the current defini-
tion of “waters of the United States” to be more consistent with recent legal 
rulings, and to align with the latest science regarding “the interconnected-
ness of tributaries, wetlands, and other waters to downstream waters and 
effects of these connections on the chemical, physical, and biological integ-
rity of downstream waters.”145 Critics of the Rule argue that it grants the 
federal government limitless authority to regulate any water in the United 
States to exceed the CWA’s statutory limits, violate principles of federalism, 
and breach the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.146 
The new Rule’s definition of “waters of the United States” contains 
several significant differences from the former definition.147 Three changes 
in particular have attracted considerable criticism and elicited attacks to the 
WOTUS Rule as violations of the Commerce Clause: (1) the definition of 
“other waters,” (2) the scope of the term “adjacent,” and (3) the construc-
tion of the term “tributaries.”148 
1. The Definition of “Other Waters” 
The old rule stated that “waters of the United States” includes: 
“[A]ll other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (in-
cluding intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, ‘wetlands,’ 
sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural 
                                                                                                                           
 143 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). 
 144 J.W. LOONEY, NAT’L AGRIC. L. CTR., HOW THE CONCEPT OF NAVIGABILITY MAY DE-
TERMINE THE RIGHTS OF LANDOWNERS ALONG STREAMS 5 (2002), http://nationalaglawcenter.
org/wp-content/uploads/assets/articles/looney_streams.pdf [perma.cc/3GBV-7L5Q]. 
 145 CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., EPA AND THE ARMY CORPS’ RULE TO 
DEFINE “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES” 3 (2016), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43455.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9X56-K7S5]. 
 146 See KLA Comment, supra note 3, at 4, 12; NAHB Comment, supra note 3, at 22, 36; 
NCBA Comment, supra note 3, at 5 n.11. 
 147 See COPELAND, supra note 145, at 15, CRS-16 to -20 (providing table summarizing dif-
ferences between the new and current rules). 
 148 See id. 
2016] New WOTUS Rule Does Not Violate the Commerce Clause 623 
ponds the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect 
interstate or foreign commerce including any such waters: (1) 
[w]hich are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for 
recreational or other purposes; or (2) [f]rom which fish or shell-
fish are or could be taken and sold in interstate or foreign com-
merce; or (3) [w]hich are used by or could be used for industrial 
purposes by industries in interstate commerce.”149 
The new Rule alters this definition by eliminating the non-exclusive list of 
“other waters” and instead proffers that “other waters” be deemed subject to 
regulation on a “case-specific” basis depending, in critical part, on whether 
they have a “significant nexus” to traditionally jurisdictional waters (navi-
gable waters, interstate waters (including wetlands), and the territorial 
seas).150 The new Rule eliminates the prior rule’s non-exclusive list of “oth-
er waters,” and replaces it with a case-by-case “significant nexus” test.151 A 
significant nexus could amount to a hydrologic connection, or could be the 
result of some other function, such as sediment trapping.152 
The final Rule, however, does limit to two areas the types of “other 
waters” that can be subject to a case-specific, significant nexus analysis.153 
The first new category includes five subcategories of waters: prairie pot-
holes, Carolina bays and Delmarva bays, pocosins, western vernal pools, 
and Texas coastal prairie wetlands.154 The second category includes “waters 
located in whole or in part within the 100-year floodplain of a traditional 
navigable water, interstate water, or the territorial seas and within 4,000 feet 
of the high tide line or [ordinary high water mark] of a jurisdictional wa-
ter.”155 While the new construction of “other waters” expands on the old 
rule by incorporating a case-specific significant nexus analysis, it also limits 
the types of “other waters” that can be deemed jurisdictional to two specific 
water-body categories.156 
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2. The Scope of the Term “Adjacent” 
The old rule’s regulatory language provided that “waters of the United 
States” also includes “[w]etlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that 
are themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (6) of this 
section.”157 The new Rule dramatically expands the types of water-bodies 
eligible to be considered waters of the United States by virtue of their adja-
cency to waters used in interstate or foreign commerce currently, previous-
ly, or possibly in the future.158 
The new Rule describes adjacent waters as “bordering, contiguous, or 
neighboring.”159 A water will be considered “neighboring” if it is: (1) locat-
ed within 100 feet of the ordinary high water mark (“OHWM”) of a juris-
dictional water; (2) located in whole or in part within the 100-year flood-
plain and is not more than 1500 feet from the OHWM of a jurisdictional 
water; or (3) located in whole or in part within 1500 feet of the high tide 
line of a jurisdictional water and within 1500 feet of the OHWM of the 
Great Lakes.160 Even if only a portion of a water is located within the de-
fined boundaries, the entire water body will nonetheless be considered 
“neighboring.”161 Additional adjacent waters—those that lie within the 100-
year floodplain and are located more than 1500 feet and up to 4000 feet 
from the OHWM—will be considered jurisdictional if they satisfy a signifi-
cant nexus test.162 
Indeed, under the new Rule, adjacent waters that are bordering, con-
tiguous, or within specified boundaries to a jurisdictional water are consid-
ered jurisdictional.163 If the adjacent water is located within the 100-year 
floodplain, but between 1500 and 4000 feet from the OHWM, it will be 
considered jurisdictional if it satisfies the significant nexus test.164 The 
agencies have determined that a significant nexus can be established by a 
hydrologic connection between waters, but one is not necessary.165 In fact, 
alternative functions that might establish a significant nexus include pollu-
tant trapping and retention of flood waters.166 
                                                                                                                           
 157 See id. at CRS-20. 
 158 See id. 
 159 See id. at CRS-23. 
 160 Id. at CRS-24 to -25. 
 161 See id. 
 162 See id. 
 163 See id. at CRS-23 to -24. 
 164 See id. at CRS-25. 
 165 See id. at 6. 
 166 See id. 
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Whereas the old regulatory language limited adjacent waters to wet-
lands, the new Rule unambiguously expands the types of water eligible to 
be considered “adjacent.”167 
3. The Definition of “Tributaries” 
The old rule limited the regulation of tributaries to “tributaries of wa-
ters identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (4) of this section.”168 Thus, it 
limited regulation to tributaries of traditionally jurisdictional waters.169 The 
term “tributary” was undefined in the old rule.170 The new Rule defines 
tributary to mean “a water that contributes flow, either directly or through 
another water . . . to a [traditionally navigable] water . . . that is character-
ized by the presence of the physical indicators of a bed and banks and an 
ordinary high water mark.”171 Indeed, the new Rule explicitly clarifies the 
meaning of tributary under the CWA.172 
The reconstruction of “other waters,” the broadening of the term “ad-
jacent,” and the new definition of “tributaries” have indeed provoked a sig-
nificant outcry from Rule opponents alleging Commerce Clause viola-
tions.173 
B. Commerce Clause Based Challenges 
On April 21, 2014, a “182-day public comment period opened” for the 
proposed WOTUS Rule, and on October 20, due to an unusually high num-
ber of submissions, EPA extended the period for an additional twenty-five 
days.174 The agencies received 20,238 comments between April 21 and No-
vember 14, 2014.175 Many of the comments came in the form of objections 
by vocal groups of the proposed Rule’s detractors, the majority of whom 
                                                                                                                           
 167 Id. at 4, CRS-19. Compare 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2015) (limiting adjacent waters to wet-
lands), with Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 
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 168 COPELAND, supra note 145, at CRS-19. 
 169 Id. at CRS-16 to -19 (defining jurisdictional waters of the United States). 
 170 Id. 
 171 See id. at CRS-25. 
 172 See id. 
 173 See id. at 15, CRS-16, -18 to -20, -25 to -26; KLA Comment, supra note 3, at 4; NAHB 
Comment, supra note 3, at 22; NCBA Comment, supra note 3, at 5. 
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 175 See Extension of Comment Period for the Definition of “Waters of the United States” 
Under the Clean Water Act Proposed Rule and Notice of Availability, 79 Fed. Reg. at 61,590–91. 
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represent the nation’s agricultural and industrial interests.176 One of the 
most common objections levied at the WOTUS Rule, and the focus of this 
Note, is the criticism that it violates the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Con-
stitution.177 
1. The New Construction of “Other Waters” 
On November 14, 2014, The National Association of Home Builders 
(“NAHB”) submitted its comments on the new WOTUS Rule.178 In its 
comments, the NAHB argues that the federal agencies’ jurisdiction is bound 
by Congress’s authority to regulate “channels” of commerce, and does not 
extend to activities that “substantially effect” interstate commerce.179 Fur-
thermore, the NAHB contends that the new Rule’s regulation of “other wa-
ters” on a case-specific basis using a “significant nexus” test violates the 
Commerce Clause.180 
Specifically, the NAHB argues that allowing the Corps and EPA to use 
scientific evidence to make case-by-case regulatory designations of “other 
waters” would give the federal agencies enough latitude to permit them to 
regulate the entire country as “waters of the United States.”181 The NAHB 
characterizes the “other waters” provision as a “catch-all,” allowing the 
agencies to “expand[] the potential scope of the CWA to any waters in the 
United States.”182 
The NAHB objections rely principally on Rapanos v. United States.183 
The NAHB argues that the Rapanos decision limits regulation of “marginal 
waters or wetlands” to those that function as “channels” of interstate com-
merce, and does not authorize regulation of those waters that may merely 
have a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce.184 In Rapanos, the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court stated in a plurality opinion: “On its only plausible 
                                                                                                                           
 176 See Stephen Bruckner, Choppy Water: An Update to the Turbulent Environment Between 
the EPA and Agricultural Opponents of the WOTUS Rule, AM. COLL. OF ENVTL. LAW. (Aug. 11, 
2014), http://acoel.org/post/2014/08/11/Choppy-Water-An-Update-to-the-Turbulent-Environment-
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KUT2]; Deadline for Comments on Feds Water Rule Extended Again, ASSOC. GEN. CONTRACTORS 
OF AM. (Nov. 3, 2014), https://www.agc.org/news/2014/11/03/deadline-comments-feds-water-rule-
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 177 See KLA Comment, supra note 3, at 4; NAHB Comment, supra note 3, at 22; NCBA 
Comment, supra note 3, at 5. 
 178 NAHB Comment, supra note 3, at 1. 
 179 See id. at 23. 
 180 See id. at 36. 
 181 See id. at 92–95, 142–43. 
 182 See id. 
 183 See 547 U.S. 715, 759 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring); NAHB Comment, supra note 3, 
at 94–95. 
 184 NAHB Comment, supra note 3, at 22–23. 
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interpretation, the phrase ‘the waters of the United States’ includes only 
those relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of wa-
ter . . . .”185 The NAHB comments also state that this interpretation of the 
CWA is affirmed by the Court in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook 
County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which held that permitting “re-
spondents to claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats” because 
they may have substantial effects on interstate commerce “would result in a 
significant impingement of the States’ traditional and primary power over 
land and water use.”186 
2. The Broadening of the Term “Adjacency” 
On November 13, 2015, the Kansas Livestock Association (“KLA”) 
submitted comments in opposition to the new WOTUS Rule.187 The organi-
zation argued that the new definition of “adjacent” violates the Commerce 
Clause because it “captures every open water in a floodplain and riparian 
area, despite whether they are isolated or have a significant connection to 
downstream waters . . . .”188 The KLA argued that the new WOTUS Rule 
expands the definition of the word “adjacent” into a “virtually limitless” 
category.189 
The organization juxtaposes the new Rule with the case United States 
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.190 In that case, the Court held that wet-
lands that abut navigable-in-fact waters can be regulated under the CWA 
because they are “inseparably bound up” with those waters.191 Isolated wa-
ters, however, lack a significant nexus to any navigable-in-fact water, and 
are therefore not subject to CWA regulation.192 The KLA contends that the 
definition of “adjacent” has been expanded to include “any open water 
within a floodplain or riparian area,” and that the scope of those terms is left 
to the “‘best professional judgment’ of the regulator,” a provision that the 
KLA says will make the category of adjacent waters virtually uncapped.193 
                                                                                                                           
 185 See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 739. 
 186 See 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001); NAHB Comment, supra note 3, at 24–28. 
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 189 Id. at 12. 
 190 See 474 U.S. 121, 134 (1985); KLA Comment, supra note 3, at 12. 
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3. The New Definition of “Tributaries” 
On October 28, 2014, the National Cattleman’s Beef Association 
(“NCBA”) filed its comments in response to the new WOTUS Rule.194 In 
its comments, the organization argues that the new Rule’s expanded defini-
tion of “tributary” gives the agencies impermissibly sweeping regulatory 
power in violation of the Commerce Clause.195 The NCBA argues that ac-
cording to the decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County, 
allowing the agencies to regulate contributing flow through any type of wa-
ter source is a Commerce Clause violation.196 In Solid Waste Agency of 
Northern Cook County, the Supreme Court held that isolated ponds entirely 
located within two Illinois counties could not be regulated under the CWA 
simply because they served as habitat for migratory birds travelling across 
state lines.197 
Petitioners in the Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County case 
argued that intrastate migratory bird habitats fell within the regulatory au-
thority of the CWA because, under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the 
authority to regulate activities that significantly affect interstate com-
merce.198 The Court found that the CWA extends to “navigable waters” or 
“waters of the United States,” and that interpreting the statute to extend to 
isolated water-body destinations for migratory birds impermissibly con-
strues the statute by reading out the word “navigable” completely.199 
The NCBA argues that, similarly to the migratory bird rule in Solid 
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County, allowing EPA and the Corps to 
regulate “contributing flow” through any type of water to a traditional “wa-
ters of the United States” water-body is an illegal violation of Congress’s 
delegated Commerce Clause authority.200 The NCBA contends that, like the 
isolated ponds in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County, tributaries 
of contributing flow through any type of water should not be subject to reg-
ulation because they read the term “navigable” out of the CWA.201 
                                                                                                                           
 194 NCBA Comment, supra note 3, at 12. 
 195 See id. at 6–12. 
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 197 See 531 U.S. at 162. 
 198 Id. at 165–66. 
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III: THE LEGALITY OF THE NEW RULE UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
A. Case-by-Case Regulatory Determinations Using the Latest Science Can 
Be Used to Find “Substantial Nexus” Connectivity to “Other Waters” 
The new Waters of the United States rule (the “WOTUS Rule” or the 
“Rule”) authorizes the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”) to regulate, on a case-
specific basis, other waters (including wetlands), provided that those waters 
alone, or in combination with other similarly situated waters (including wet-
lands), located in the same region, have a “significant nexus” to a traditional 
navigable water, interstate water, or the territorial seas.202 The Rule permits 
EPA and the Corps to use scientific evidence in case-specific determinations 
of whether other waters satisfy this “substantial nexus test.”203 The Rule has 
been challenged, by the National Association of Home Builders and others, 
for its implementation of case-specific regulatory determinations and the 
use of scientific analysis to determine whether a source of “other water” 
bears a substantial nexus to a navigable-in-fact water.204 
In United States v. Alderman, the U.S Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit considered whether a statute prohibiting a felon from purchasing, 
owning, or possessing body armor in interstate commerce exceeded Con-
gress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.205 In the court’s analysis, it 
concluded that questions of Commerce Clause jurisprudence should be 
evaluated using case-specific analysis, and in fact, “bald assertions” of 
Commerce Clause application should be viewed with skepticism.206 Indeed, 
case-specific, individualized analysis is a legally permissible—in fact pre-
ferred—manner of evaluating Commerce Clause jurisdiction.207 
Furthermore, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit has held that it is also appropriate to use scientific evidence in a 
Commerce Clause analysis.208 In National Ass’n of Homebuilders v. Bab-
bitt, the D.C. Circuit considered whether the extinction of animals substan-
tially affects interstate commerce.209 The court held that it was appropriate 
to consider scientific evidence, stating:  
                                                                                                                           
 202 Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 
37,096 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.). 
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 204 See KLA Comment, supra note 3, at 14, 22; NAHB Comment, supra note 3, at 36; NCBA 
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 208 See 130 F.3d 1041, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 209 Id. at 1043. 
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Scientific evidence that is currently available provides sufficient 
support for Congress’ conclusion that regulation of the ‘taking’ of 
endangered animals is within its Commerce Clause power be-
cause such takings, if permitted, would have a substantial effect 
on interstate commerce by depriving commercial actors of access 
to an important natural resource—biodiversity.210 
While the National Association of Home Builders (“NAHB”) contends that 
a scientific, case-by-case approach to designating waters as jurisdictional 
would untenably expand the agencies’ regulatory authority by making the 
category of “waters of the United States” unlimited, there is ample case ev-
idence to support the proposition that such an individualistic approach not 
only works, but is legally permissible under the Commerce Clause.211 
B. Regulation of “Other Waters” with a “Substantial Nexus” to  
Navigable-in-Fact Waters Qualifies as Regulating a  
“Channel” of Interstate Commerce 
The “case-specific” analysis to determine whether an “other water” has 
a significant nexus to a water that is navigable focuses on the degree to 
which the “other water” affects the chemical, physical, or biological integri-
ty of the navigable-in-fact water.212 The WOTUS Rule has been challenged 
by opposition groups, including the NAHB, for impermissibly regulating 
under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), activities that substantially affect in-
terstate commerce, rather than “channels” of interstate commerce.213 In-
deed, the power of Congress to regulate activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce is limited, as the NAHB suggests, to activities that are 
economic in nature.214 
In United States v. Deaton, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit considered whether the CWA could prohibit private property owners 
from discharging fill material into wetlands adjacent to traditional navigable 
waters.215 The Fourth Circuit held that the Commerce Clause can be used to 
                                                                                                                           
 210 Id. at 1054. 
 211 See Alderman, 565 F.3d at 658; Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1054; NAHB 
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regulate not just channels of interstate commerce themselves, but also their 
use or misuse.216 Additionally, in United States v. Royal Rock Co-op, the 
United States Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the Secre-
tary of the U.S. Department of Agriculture had overstepped his Commerce 
Clause authority by issuing an order regulating the handling of milk in the 
New York metropolitan area.217 The Court found that the Commerce 
Clause, in addition to regulating channels of interstate commerce them-
selves, also authorizes the regulation of activities that interfere with inter-
state commerce.218 
The regulatory determinations called for by the new Rule focus on the 
degree to which the “other water” affects the chemical, physical, or biologi-
cal integrity of the navigable-in-fact water.219 Therefore, it effectually fo-
cuses on several ways in which the “other water” could interfere with the 
way a navigable-in-fact water is used.220 Thus, the regulation prescribed in 
the new WOTUS Rule could reasonably be described as a controlling inter-
ference with, or the use or misuse of, a “channel” of interstate commerce.221 
The NAHB’s argument that “other water” regulation under the new Rule is 
an impermissible stretch of Commerce Clause power to regulate activities 
that “substantially affect interstate commerce” is unsound, because the 
regulation can be understood as preventing misuse and interference with 
navigable-in-fact “channels” of interstate commerce that might be “mis-
used” through pollution, or otherwise chemically, physically, or biologically 
interfered with via flow connectivity.222 
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C. Holding That Adjacent Waters Are Categorically Jurisdictional for Having 
a “Significant Nexus” to Navigable-in-Fact Waters Is a Permissible 
Formulation of “Adjacency” Under the Commerce Clause 
The new WOTUS Rule considers “adjacent waters” to be categorically 
jurisdictional, and defines “adjacent” to mean “bordering, contiguous or 
neighboring.”223 A water-body that is bordering, or contiguous with a tradi-
tionally jurisdictional water, is itself jurisdictional by virtue of a physical, 
chemical, or biological hydrologic connection that occurs through actual con-
tact.224 A water will also be categorically jurisdictional if it is considered 
neighboring, meaning that it is close enough in proximity to a traditional nav-
igable water, interstate water, or the territorial seas.225 
EPA and the Corps have emphasized that the best currently available 
science supports that waters within the proximity limits establishing adja-
cency “possess the requisite connection to downstream waters and function 
as a system to protect the chemical, physical, or biological integrity of those 
waters.”226 Other waters that are adjacent but less hydrologically connected 
must pass a significant nexus test to be considered jurisdictional.227 While 
the scope of the term “adjacent” is certainly broader than before, it still re-
quires that the adjacent water have either some form of hydrologic connec-
tion to water that is navigable-in-fact, or alternatively, a significant enough 
nexus so as to influence the quality of the jurisdictional water.228 This inter-
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pretation is consistent with prevailing judicial interpretations.229 Courts 
have held that, to establish CWA jurisdiction of waters, there must be “some 
measure of the significance of the connection for downstream water quali-
ty.”230 
In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, the Supreme Court heard a challenge to the Corps’s exercise of 
jurisdiction over an abandoned gravel pit.231 The Court held that the pres-
ence of a “hydrologic connection” to a navigable-in-fact water is sufficient 
to establish CWA jurisdiction over “other waters.”232 The Court clarified 
this point in Rapanos v. United States, in which the federal government al-
leged in an enforcement action that developers dumped fill material into 
protected wetlands in violation of the CWA.233 The Court held that not eve-
ry hydrologic connection could satisfy the significant nexus requirement, 
because “the connection may be too insubstantial for the hydrologic linkage 
to establish the required nexus with navigable waters as traditionally under-
stood.”234 
Because the definition of “adjacent” requires a hydrologic link or sig-
nificant nexus between adjacent waters and navigable-in-fact waters, it 
eliminates the need for federal agencies to demonstrate separate Commerce 
Clause jurisdiction over the adjacent water body.235 A significant nexus 
means that separate waters affect one another, and therefore the waters can 
be “evaluated as a single landscape unit with regard to their effect on the 
chemical, physical and biological integrity” of navigable-in-fact waters 
used as channels of interstate or foreign commerce.236 
In United States v. Cundiff, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit considered whether or not wetlands located on private property were 
sufficiently adjacent to a navigable-in-fact river.237 The Sixth Circuit deter-
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mined that due to a significant nexus between two tributaries, the wetlands 
were in fact adjacent, and thus fell within CWA jurisdiction.238 Specifically, 
the court found that the Cundiff family’s alterations consisting of “unau-
thorized ditch digging, the mechanical clearing of land, and the dredging of 
material and using it as filler” had affected the wetlands’ water storage ca-
pacity, which in turn affected the regularity and extent of flooding, and 
augmented the flood peaks in the river.239 Due to the hydrologic connection 
between the wetlands and the river, the court described a potential Com-
merce Clause challenge as “tenuous.”240 Furthermore, in United States v. 
Robinson, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it 
was “well established that Congress intended to regulate the discharge of 
pollutants into all waters that may eventually lead to waters affecting inter-
state commerce.”241 
The KLA argues that the scope of “adjacent waters” in the new 
WOTUS Rule is contrary to Justice Anthony Kennedy’s concurring opinion 
in Rapanos v. United States because it would allow geographically isolated 
waters to fall under CWA regulation.242 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, 
however, did not construe adjacency to depend exclusively on geographic 
locality, but also on whether the water in question “affects water quality” of 
a navigable-in-fact water.243 Furthermore, there is ample legal support for 
the proposition that adjacency can properly be determined on the basis of a 
significant nexus test.244 
D. The “Migratory Bird Rule” Does Not Apply to the New Definition of 
“Tributaries” as Alleged by the NCBA 
The new WOTUS Rule defines “tributary” to mean a waterbody that 
contributes flow to a navigable-in-fact water.245 This definition has been 
challenged by opposition groups, including the NCBA, which argues specif-
ically that the regulation of tributaries falls within the scope of the “migra-
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tory bird rule” discredited in the Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook 
County decision.246 The “migratory bird rule” in Solid Waste Agency of 
Northern Cook County, however, served as an example of when an “activ-
it[y] that ‘substantially affect[s]’ interstate commerce,” is itself too tenuous-
ly related to commerce to allow for Commerce Clause regulatory jurisdic-
tion.247 By contrast, the expanded definition of tributary allows for federal 
regulation over non-navigable waters that flow into navigable-in-fact wa-
ters.248 The new Rule expands the definition of tributary with the under-
standing that their flow-connectivity to navigable-in-fact waters affects 
those waters chemically, physically, and biologically.249 
The expanded definition subjects all significantly connected tributaries 
to federal regulation under CWA jurisdiction.250 As the Eleventh Circuit 
held in Robinson, it is “well established that Congress intended to regulate 
the discharge of pollutants into all waters that may eventually lead to waters 
affecting interstate commerce.”251 Furthermore, as the Supreme Court held 
in Royal Rock Co-op, the Commerce Clause also authorizes the regulation 
of activities that interfere with channels of interstate commerce.252 
The Supreme Court discredited the “migratory bird rule” as an overex-
tension of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority to regulate an activity 
insufficiently related to interstate commerce, but that is not the case here.253 
The WOTUS Rule seeks to regulate tributaries on the basis of flow connec-
tivity.254 As the Supreme Court established in Royal Rock Co-op, the Com-
merce Clause extends to activities that interfere with channels of interstate 
commerce, and flow connectivity, as the Eleventh Circuit articulated in 
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Robinson, clearly falls within the categories of activities “affecting inter-
state commerce” if regulated to preserve water quality.255 
CONCLUSION 
Many parties in opposition to the “Waters of the United States” rule 
(the “Rule”) have expressed in public comment that the Rule violates the 
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution—specifically, that the new con-
struction of “other waters,” the expanded definition of the term “adjacent,” 
and the revised definition of “tributary,” allow the federal government to 
use unconstitutional, broad-based authority to regulate purely intrastate 
matters with no legally allowable link to interstate commerce. In relevant 
part, the National Association of Home Builders, the Kansas Livestock As-
sociation, and the National Cattleman’s Beef Association have been particu-
larly vocal in opposition to the Rule on Commerce Clause grounds. For the 
above-stated reasons, the three major revisions of the new Rule are not un-
constitutional under the Commerce Clause, as argued in the comments 
submitted by those three opposition parties. 
                                                                                                                           
 255 See Royal Rock Co-op, 307 U.S. at 544; Robinson, 505 F.3d at 1215 (“Congress intended 
to regulate the discharge of pollutants into all waters that may eventually lead to waters affecting 
interstate commerce . . . .”). 
